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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Despite a long tradition of writing dedicated to the legal history 
of Latin America, the field in recent decades has been overshadowed 
by a more extensive body of work examining the social and economic 
history of the region.  For better than a generation, historians of the 
region, often aided by interdisciplinary training in the social sciences 
or, even, informed by anthropologists, sociologists, and economists 
doing historical research on the region, have brought new 
understandings of previously underexplored populations, such as 
peasants, the industrial proletariat, women as independent actors, and 
indigenous and Afro-American populations, among others.1  This 
newer historiography has often brought a needed balance to the field, a 
correction of the tendency of previous generations of historians to 
concentrate on political history and ruling elites, sometimes to the 
exclusion of the less powerful and the less visible.2 
                                                 
 
*
 Harold Paul Green Research Professor of Law and Professor of History and 
Sociology, The George Washington University.  I would like to thank Raymond T. Diamond 
for reading an earlier draft of this Essay and for making helpful suggestions. 
 1. See, e.g., Alan Knight, Research Report, Subalterns, Signifiers, and Statistics:  
Perspectives on Mexican Historiography, LATIN AM. RES. REV., Summer 2002, at 136, 136-
38 (providing an overview of Latin American historiography). 
 2. Id. at 137-48 (advocating Latin-American scholarship that evaluates “paradigms, 
schools of thought, and theoretical premises”). 
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 This change in emphasis is also coming to legal history.  Writings 
on Latin-American legal history, the functioning of courts, legal 
doctrine, and the role of lawyers, have until quite recently been a fairly 
traditional field concerned primarily with institutional histories and the 
evolution of legal doctrine, largely through the adoption of new 
codes.3  The history of law and how that history influenced or failed to 
influence social status, politics, family life, relations among different 
racial and ethnic groups, and crime and punishment, the kind of legal 
historiography that U.S. legal historian Lawrence Friedman called, in 
his effort to similarly reorient American legal history, “a social history 
of American law” was largely lacking in the writings produced by 
historians of Latin America.4 
 If historians had been relatively slow in the effort to develop a 
social history of Latin-American law, legal scholars have also been 
slow to explore the possibilities of examining the behavior and 
function of law in the past and how the law has helped to shape, and in 
turn has been shaped, by the complex social and cultural histories of 
the different societies of Latin America.5  There are perhaps many 
reasons for this.  Certainly the view of many regional specialists that 
law is little more than an instrument to maintain elite power and 
privilege and, hence, an institution less worthy of study than political 
alignments, clientism, or military power has probably contributed to 
the relative neglect of the field.6  There has also been, it is fair to say, a 
                                                 
 3. Silvia Marina Arrom, New Directions in Mexican Legal History, 50 AMERICAS 
461, 461-65 (1994) (discussing the formulation and implementation of the Mexican legal 
system).  For two recent examples of historians working in the area of Latin-American legal 
history and doing important work in combining the history of law with social history, see 
generally 1 LINDA LEWIN, SURPRISE HEIRS:  ILLEGITIMACY, PATRIMONIAL RIGHTS, AND LEGAL 
NATIONALISM IN LUSO-BRAZILIAN INHERITANCE, 1750-1821 (2003) [hereinafter 1 LEWIN, 
SURPRISE HEIRS], 2 LINDA LEWIN, SURPRISE HEIRS:  ILLEGITIMACY, INHERITANCE RIGHTS, AND 
PUBLIC POWER IN THE FORMATION OF IMPERIAL BRAZIL, 1822-1889 (2003); REBECCA J. 
SCOTT, DEGREES OF FREEDOM:  LOUISIANA AND CUBA AFTER SLAVERY (2005); and VICTOR M. 
URIBE-URAN, HONORABLE LIVES:  LAWYERS, FAMILY, AND POLITICS IN COLOMBIA, 1780-1850 
(2000). 
 4. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 12 (2d ed. 1985) 
(emphasis omitted).  For a discussion of Latin-American historiography and its relationship 
to more recent trends in the writing of social history, see Carlos Aguirre & Ricardo D. 
Salvatore, Introduction:  Writing the History of Law, Crime, and Punishment in Latin 
America, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN LATIN AMERICA:  LAW AND SOCIETY SINCE LATE 
COLONIAL TIMES 1, 1-32 (Ricardo D. Salvatore et al. eds., 2001). 
 5. See Arrom, supra note 3, at 461-65 (noting from a historical perspective how 
Mexican law affected local communities). 
 6. For an edited volume of papers discussing the difficulties of establishing effective 
conditions allowing law to protect the powerless in Latin America, see generally THE 
(UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA (Juan E. Méndez et al. eds., 
1999) [hereinafter THE (UN)RULE OF LAW]. 
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formalism and relatively narrow emphasis on legal doctrine in the 
training of lawyers and legal scholars at most law faculties in Latin 
America, inhibiting the development of legal scholars as well as 
practicing attorneys comfortable with the social sciences and prepared 
to integrate into legal analysis social, economic, or cultural factors 
necessary to do a truly interdisciplinary legal history.7 
 Underdeveloped in the Latin-American legal historiography is 
the kind of historical sociology of law suggested by U.S. legal 
historian William Novak.8  Novak, in an article examining James 
Willard Hurst, discussed the work of the pioneering legal historian and 
his role in moving the historiography of U.S. law from its fairly 
narrow doctrinal origins to a broader field of inquiry.9  This inquiry 
encompassed “‘a broad concern with law’s operational ties to other 
components of social order [that] will lead to the contributions the 
study of legal history should make to an illuminating sociology of 
law.’”10  This kind of historical sociology of law would presumably 
use law and its history not merely to illustrate the evolution of legal 
doctrine, or how the law resolved certain controversies, or even how it 
was influenced by the social currents of different eras.  It would do 
these things of course, but it would presumably do something more.  It 
would use the law as a window into the very civilization being studied.  
It would recognize that the law, both as stated and as actually applied, 
in the values expressed and in the promises unrealized, reveals a 
society and its culture in both its aims and its contradictions.  This 
approach, I would argue, is an especially important one to bring to the 
study of legal history in Latin America.  Many students of Latin-
American law have long noted the gap between the law as stated and 
the law as actually applied.11  There has been in the history of law in 
Latin America what might be termed a kind of normative nominalism, 
                                                 
 7. See my discussion of Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Joaquim Benedito Barbosa 
Gomes’ call for the Brazilian adoption of some aspects of legal realism in cases involving 
race in Robert J. Cottrol, Brown and the Contemporary Brazilian Struggle Against Racial 
Inequality:  Some Preliminary Comparative Thoughts, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 113, 124-27 (2004) 
(outlining Justice Gomes’ reconciliation of affirmative action with the Brazilian 
Constitution).  For a good, short overview of Brazilian legal education, see Nadia de Araujo, 
Estado de la Educación Legal Brasileña, 70 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 783 passim (2001). 
 8. See William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State:  The Historical 
Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 140-45 (2000). 
 9. See id. at 98-99. 
 10. Id. at 99 (quoting Willard Hurst, The Law in United States History, 104 PROC. 
AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 518, 521 (1960)). 
 11. See, e.g., Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, The Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in 
Latin America:  Introduction, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW, supra note 6, at 1, 1-15 (asserting 
that the new democratic constitutions of most Latin American countries did not effectively 
reform legal institutions or change state agents’ practices). 
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a desire to use the law to make important normative statements, 
followed by often minimalist or nominal enforcement or application of 
legal norms.12  By no means has this been an exclusively Latin-
American phenomenon.  One need consider only the unhappy fate of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s protection of racial minorities’ voting rights in the 
United States in the first half of the twentieth century to realize this.13  
But the gap between legal norms and legal applications has been 
stronger in Latin America than in many other societies.  In some ways, 
the gap has become institutionalized with ordinary citizens, and indeed 
even public officials, routinely anticipating that the stated rules cannot 
reasonably be followed and adjusting their behavior on that 
assumption.14  All of this makes seeing Latin-American legal history 
with the kind of historical-sociological lens that Novak suggested 
more interesting and more compelling. 
 This Essay examines three books that bring us closer to the 
integration of Latin-American legal history with the broader political 
and social history of the region.  The three books, O fiador dos 
brasileiros:  Cidadania, escravidão e direito civil no tempo de Antonio 
Pereira Rebouças,15 Measures of Equality:  Social Science, 
Citizenship, and Race in Cuba, 1902-1940,16 and Drowning in Laws:  
Labor Law and Brazilian Political Culture17 have all been published 
since 2001 and represent the newer effort by historians and social 
scientists concerned with Latin America to integrate legal and social 
history.  Taken together, the three works raise important questions 
concerning the often profound disjuncture between legal norms and 
social practice that frequently occurs in much of Latin America.  This 
disjuncture is often most glaring when issues of race and class 
inequality are considered.  All three books give different and important 
perspectives on this critical issue for scholars concerned with law and 
Latin-American culture. 
                                                 
 12. Id. at 2. 
 13. See ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:  CASTE, CULTURE 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 34-39 (2003). 
 14. See generally Keith S. Rosenn, The Jeito:  Brazil’s Institutional Bypass of the 
Formal Legal System and Its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. COMP. LAW 514 (1971). 
 15. KEILA GRINBERG, O FIADOR DOS BRASILEIROS:  CIDADANIA, ESCRAVIDÃO E DIREITO 
CIVIL NO TEMPO DE ANTONIO PEREIRA REBOUÇAS (2002). 
 16. ALEJANDRA BRONFMAN, MEASURES OF EQUALITY:  SOCIAL SCIENCE, CITIZENSHIP, 
AND RACE IN CUBA, 1902-1940 (2004). 
 17. JOHN D. FRENCH, DROWNING IN LAWS:  LABOR LAW AND BRAZILIAN POLITICAL 
CULTURE (2004). 
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 This Essay will examine these three books, and it is divided into 
three Parts.  The first Part discusses Keila Grinberg’s O fiador dos 
brasileiros, placing her biographical study within the context of the 
paradox of the nineteenth-century Brazilian Empire.  The Brazilian 
Empire’s Constitution of 1824 (1824 Constitution) has rightly been 
described by historians as liberal, and yet it governed the society 
whose economy was probably more dependent on slave labor than any 
other nation in the Americas in the nineteenth century.18  The second 
Part looks at Alejandra Bronfman’s Measures of Equality and how the 
new racial thinking of the early twentieth century helped shape the 
behavior of legal actors in Cuba and the drafting of the racially liberal, 
but ultimately ineffective, Constitution of 1940.  The third Part 
considers John French’s Drowning in Laws and what his volume can 
tell us not only about labor law, social hierarchy, and political culture 
in twentieth-century Brazil, but also what his study suggests about the 
overall effectiveness of law and legal institutions in Brazil more 
generally. 
II. LIBERAL CONSTITUTION, CONSERVATIVE CULTURE:  THE 
SCHIZOPHRENIC BRAZILIAN EMPIRE 
 Antonio Pereira Rebouças, the subject of Grinberg’s biography, 
in many ways led a life that encapsulated the contradictions that were 
the nineteenth-century Brazilian Empire.19  A prominent lawyer, 
juriscounsult (or legal commentator), and politician of the Brazilian 
Empire, Rebouças’s life in many ways embodied the contest that was 
being waged for the soul of the giant empire in the nineteenth 
century.20  A mulatto, the son of a Portuguese father and a liberta, or 
manumitted, mother, Rebouças would rise high in the legal and 
political cultures of nineteenth-century Brazil, yet he would always be 
subject to spoken and unspoken prejudices due to his race and color.21  
An opponent of racial discrimination, Rebouças would nonetheless 
become a slaveholder and would defend slaveholders in court in 
manumission suits between slaves and slave owners.22  Rebouças 
could eloquently argue against discrimination against free black and 
                                                 
 18. HERBERT S. KLEIN, THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 37-38 (1999). 
 19. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 153-54. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 201-02 (noting that Rebouças participated in four suits representing slaves 
and five representing slave owners). 
  
 
 
6 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1 
 
mulatto citizens of Brazil while still supporting the suppression of 
slave revolts and decrying what he saw as African barbarism.23 
 In O fiador dos brasileiros, Grinberg captures the ideological, 
economic, and cultural crosscurrents that were an integral part of the 
Brazilian Empire reflected in the newly-formed empire’s 1824 
Constitution and the statutes, decrees, and court decisions that were a 
part of nineteenth-century Brazilian law.24  The Enlightenment, the 
liberal imagination that would transform the Atlantic world in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was having an influence on 
Portugal and her giant Brazilian colony.25  Toward the end of the 
eighteenth century, Brazilian elites, chafing under Portugal’s 
mercantilist restrictions, began to find justification for greater 
autonomy, at least for themselves, in the liberal political philosophies 
developed in France and elsewhere in Europe.26  These led to abortive 
struggles for independence in various Brazilian venues, including 
Rebouças’s native Bahia.27  If these struggles proved unsuccessful in 
separating Brazil from Portugal, they nonetheless helped increase a 
sense of nationalism among Brazilian elites and indeed, as Brazilian 
historian Emilia Viotti da Costa has noted, among many of the 
Brazilian masses, slave and free, as well.28  These elites hoped that 
independence and the liberal ideals that independence advocates were 
espousing would lead to freedom and better conditions.29  The 
Napoleonic Wars would ultimately give independence advocates their 
victory.30  The French Emperor’s occupation of Portugal in 1808 
would force the displacement of the Portuguese Monarch to Brazil.31  
By 1815, Brazil was declared a kingdom united with Portugal.32  By 
1822, Brazil had declared itself an independent empire with Pedro I as 
its emperor.33 
 The new empire would need a new constitution, but what would 
be its basis?  If liberal ideals had informed the movement for 
independence and had served as a vehicle for rallying the population to 
the nationalist standard, liberalism also posed a problem for the new 
                                                 
 23. Id. at 174. 
 24. Id. at 23-35. 
 25. See EMILIA VIOTTI DA COSTA, THE BRAZILIAN EMPIRE:  MYTHS AND HISTORIES 58-
61 (rev. ed. 2000). 
 26. See id. 
 27. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 48-49. 
 28. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 7-12. 
 29. Id. at 10-12. 
 30. See id. at 12, 15-23. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 17-20. 
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nation’s most important economic and social institution—slavery.34  
This problem was not, of course, uniquely Brazilian.  Throughout the 
Americas, the revolutions for independence generally informed by 
broad liberal notions of “the rights of man” left the first-generation 
constitution drafters with the question of what to do about slavery.35  
The nations that secured their independence from Spain quickly 
recognized, as a legal principle, that slavery was incompatible with the 
professed ideals of their struggles for independence and indeed their 
new constitutions.36  The Spanish-speaking nations that would emerge 
from the independence struggles took different routes to emancipation.  
Mexico abolished slavery directly by statute in 1829, nineteen years 
after independence.37  Other nations, like Peru and Argentina, had long 
tortured routes toward emancipation with significant efforts to reverse 
or ignore earlier legislative attempts to put a gradual end to slavery.38  
Many statesmen of the founding generation in the United States 
recognized the incompatibility of slavery and the professed ideals of 
the American Revolution and Constitution, although the Constitution 
did recognize property rights in human beings, even providing a 
fugitive-slave clause to add federal protection to the institution.39  It 
nonetheless should be added that any discussion of the United States 
and the reaction of the founding generation to the contradiction 
between liberalism and slavery should also include a discussion of 
state statutes, constitutions, and judicial decisions.  If the nation as a 
whole failed to live up to its professed ideals, it is nonetheless 
important to note that at least half the states, those northern states 
where slavery was not central to the economy, did act on the ideals of 
the American Revolution, legally beginning the process of ending 
slavery within their borders.40 
                                                 
 34. See id. at 22-23, 126-27. 
 35. Id. at 58-62. 
 36. Cf. GEORGE REID ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000, at 90-91 (2004). 
 37. LESLIE B. ROUT, JR., THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN SPANISH AMERICA 279-82 
(Markus Wiener Publishers 2003) (1976). 
 38. See, e.g., Guyora Binder, The Slavery of Emancipation, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2063, 2079 (noting the “gradual emancipation plan” in Argentina).  For an important 
discussion of the difficulties of achieving final abolition in Peru and the role of Afro-
Peruvians in achieving that abolition see CARLOS AGUIRRE, AGENTES DE SU PROPIA LIBERTAD:  
LOS ESCLAVOS DE LIMA Y LA DESINTEGRACIÓN DE LA ESCLAVITUD, 1821-1854 (1993). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XIII; see 
Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach:  Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism Through 
the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1788 (2006) (noting Thomas 
Jefferson’s concern that slavery was incongruent with the ideals of the American Revolution). 
 40. For a discussion of northern emancipation, see generally ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, 
THE FIRST EMANCIPATION:  THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH (1967).  Ira Berlin 
makes the important point that northern abolition was a more difficult and problematic 
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 Brazilians too recognized that slavery contradicted the professed 
liberal ideals for which the struggle for independence had been 
waged.41  But slavery was more profoundly a part of the Brazilian 
social order than had been the case in the former Spanish colonies or 
even, for the most part, the southern part of the United States.42  By 
1822, over one-third of the Brazilian population was enslaved.43  
Better than seventy percent of the population consisted of blacks or 
mulattoes, slave, liberto,44 and free.45  Between 1801 and 1860, Brazil 
imported some 1,719,500 African slaves, more than three times the 
number imported into British North America and the United States in 
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries combined.46  
Owning slaves was not merely a means to a livelihood—the 
cultivation of a sugar plantation in Bahia or the extraction of gold from 
a mine in Minas Gerais—it was a symbol of a person’s wealth, power, 
and indeed status, an indication to all that one was part of the better 
classes.47 
 It was against this background that Brazil’s 1824 Constitution 
was debated and finally adopted.48  The 1824 Constitution reflected the 
influence of the Enlightenment and its ideas of fundamental rights and 
equality for all citizens.49  Title 2 of the 1824 Constitution recognized 
                                                                                                             
process than generally has been appreciated.  See IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE:  THE 
FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 228-55 (1998). 
 41. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 126-27; Antonio Penalves Rocha, Idéias 
antiescravistas da Ilustração na sociedade escravista brasileira, 20 REV. BRASILEIRA DE 
HISTÓRIA 37 passim (2000) (Braz.). 
 42. Cf. ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 55. 
 43. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 128. 
 44. Liberto status was something of a midpoint between slavery and freedom.  
Manumission in Brazil was typically accomplished by means of a document known as an 
alforria.  EUNICE APARECIDA DE JESUS PRUDENTE, PRECONCEITO RACIAL E IGUALDADE 
JURÍDICA NO BRASIL 93 (1989).  It was discretionary on the part of the slave owner and could 
be accompanied by conditions.  Id. at 93-94.  Those who were conditionally manumitted had 
the status of libertos.  Id. at 95-97.  In some cases their manumissions could be revoked.  Id.  
One potential ground for revocation was ingratitude, a condition that of course maintained, or 
possibly increased, patron-client ties between libertos and former masters.  Id.  The 
Constitution of 1824 made libertos citizens, although they were prohibited from voting.  Id.  
The children of libertos were ingênuos, and they had voting rights.  Id.; see Robert J. Cottrol, 
The Long Lingering Shadow:  Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Racial Hierarchy and 
Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REV. 11, 57 (2001). 
 45. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 46. 
 46. KLEIN, supra note 18, app. tbl. A-2.  By way of comparison, the total number of 
Africans estimated to have been forcibly brought into what is now the United States is 
559,800; the total number to Brazil 4,029,800.  See id. 
 47. Cf. Cottrol, supra note 44, at 56. 
 48. See DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 58-61 (discussing the debates and adoption of 
the 1824 Constitution). 
 49. See id. 
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the citizenship of all free Brazilians, including libertos.50  Title 8 
recognized the principles of freedom of speech and of the press, of 
freedom from religious persecution, freedom of the home from 
government searches, the right to due process in criminal procedures, 
and prohibitions on ex post facto criminal law.51  Title 8 also prohibited 
torture, special privileges, and recognized the equality of all citizens 
before the law.52  Although the 1824 Constitution did not mention 
slavery, it had strong guarantees for property rights that were generally 
recognized as protecting the rights of slaveholders.53  Of equal or 
probably even greater importance, the 1824 Constitution insured that 
political power would remain in the hands of slaveholding elites.54  
Property and income qualifications for voting allowed few men who 
were not of the elite, slaveholding class the opportunity to participate 
in politics.55 
 The profound paradox presented by the imperial Brazilian 
constitutional order lay in a curious combination of constitutional 
liberalism, race-based slavery, and the formal commitment of the law 
to the ideal of equality for all, regardless of race or color.56  In some 
ways it was a cognitive dissonance even more profound than that 
found in the constitutional order in the United States.  If the U.S. 
Constitution originally had nothing explicit to say concerning race, 
before the Civil War, it also had no provisions defining citizenship or 
asserting the equal status before the law of all citizens.57  Race-based 
slavery existed in the United States but it was largely justified, i.e., 
made coherent in a liberal society, through a national ideology that 
increasingly used principles of racial inferiority and the doctrine that 
even free Negroes were not citizens.58  Brazil could not easily turn to 
                                                 
 50. CONSTITUIÇÃO POLÍTICA DO IMPÉRIO DO BRASIL DE 1824 [BRAZILIAN EMPIRE 
CONSTITUTION OF 1824] tit. 2, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/ 
brazil1824.html. 
 51. Id. tit. 8. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. tit 8, art. 179, § XXII. 
 54. See DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 58-62. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Robert J. Cottrol, The Thirteenth Amendment and the North’s Overlooked 
Egalitarian Heritage, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 198, 199-200 (1990) (noting that an impetus 
behind the Thirteenth Amendment was establishing a mechanism for equality). 
 58. This, like all generalizations, is too broad and fails to capture the full complexity 
of race and legal status in the antebellum United States.  Id. at 202-03.  There was, as I have 
argued previously, a period roughly between the end of the American Revolution and the 
1820s, and in some states later, where black men enjoyed the status of citizens—as evidenced 
by their having the right to vote—if they could satisfy existing property qualifications.  Id.  
These suffrage rights existed in a majority of states, both North and South, and only began to 
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racialist ideology as a source of justification for its slave system.59  
Profound racism existed, to be sure, in nineteenth-century Brazil.  
Race and color prejudice combined with strong class barriers and, 
often, profound cultural distances between slaves, who were often 
recently imported Africans and free Brazilians of both Portuguese and 
African descent.60  But these barriers did not give rise to the rigid kinds 
of legal distinctions that, more often than not, limited the lives of 
people of African descent in the United States in the era of slavery and 
beyond.61 
 Grinberg provides an important insight into the formation of the 
Brazilian constitutional and social order when she discusses the impact 
of the Haitian revolution on Brazilian constitutional debates.62  The 
revolution in Santo Domingo had the effect of horrifying slave owners 
throughout the Americas, spurring some toward quicker acceptance of 
proposed emancipatory measures, moving others toward greater 
repression, and causing still others to consent to the adoption of 
ameliorative measures designed to forestall potential rebellion as well 
as criticisms from a Western world increasingly skeptical of slavery.63  
                                                                                                             
be lost in the nineteenth century, ironically at the same time as the broadening of suffrage 
rights, i.e., the dropping of property requirements that occurred for white men.  Id. 
(discussing suffrage rights of free black men in the antebellum United States).  Supreme 
Court Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis used the existence of black suffrage at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution to make a persuasive argument that free Negroes were citizens in 
his dissent in Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott).  See 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 573-76 (1856) 
(Curtis, J., dissenting), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  Arguably the situation in 
slave states, such as North Carolina and Tennessee where free black men retained the right to 
vote until the mid-1830s, bore a great deal of resemblance to the legal and social order that 
existed in the Brazilian Empire, i.e., slavery had the sanction of law, it was based on race, and 
yet an individual of the enslaved race could attain citizen status.  Compare Cottrol, supra note 
44, at 50 (discussing the rights of free black men in the antebellum South) with DA COSTA, 
supra note 25, at 125-28 (discussing Brazil’s transition from free to slave labor).  As the 
nineteenth century unfolded, the possibility for that kind of ambiguity in racial ideology in 
the slave states of the United States became less and less possible as free Negroes in the 
southern states became subject to an increasing regime of restrictions making clear the rights 
associated with citizenship would be reserved for whites.  See generally IRA BERLIN, SLAVES 
WITHOUT MASTERS:  THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1974) (discussing the 
emergence and culture of free Blacks in the antebellum South).  For a good discussion of 
regional variation in the legal status of free blacks in the antebellum North, see Paul 
Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment:  Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum 
North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 passim (1986). 
 59. DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 55-62, 234-46. 
 60. Id.; see JOÃO JOSÉ REIS, SLAVE REBELLION IN BRAZIL:  THE MUSLIM UPRISING OF 
1835 IN BAHIA 5, 63, 142 (Arthur Brakel trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1993) (1986). 
 61. Cottrol, supra note 57, at 199-206 (discussing the struggle for racial equality 
following the Civil War). 
 62. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 50-51. 
 63. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE:  THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN 
THE NEW WORLD 212-14, 237 (2006). 
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In Brazil, the realization that free mulattoes had joined with rebellious 
slaves in Santo Domingo caused a fear that similar alliances might 
occur in Brazil.64  This certainly contributed to a greater willingness on 
the part of the drafters of the 1824 Constitution to accept the principle 
of equal rights and citizenship for all free Brazilians.65 
 Rebouças’s legal and political career helps give us some sense of 
how free Brazilians in the nineteenth century navigated their nation’s 
cognitively difficult combination of race, slavery, and enlightenment 
values.66  For Rebouças, liberal values, a rejection of discrimination 
based on race or color, a revulsion against African culture and an 
acceptance—and indeed participation to a point—in the system of 
slavery all were part of a coherent way of looking at the world and one 
that was by no means singular in the Brazilian Empire of the early 
nineteenth century.67  This world view was shaped by the dynamics of 
a slave society, which although based almost from the beginning on 
the enslavement of Africans and their descendants,68 had social and 
demographic currents that made race per se less important than it 
would be in a society like the United States.69  The very harshness of 
Brazilian slavery insured that there would be a continuous importation 
of new African slaves to replace those who perished in the harsh 
conditions that prevailed in the plantations of Bahia or the mines of 
Minas Gerais.70  These Africans would be culturally distinctive and not 
infrequently frightening not only to whites but often to native born 
Afro-Brazilians as well.71  The society that had emerged by the early 
                                                 
 64. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 50-51. 
 65. See id.  The influence of French thought and French examples more broadly also 
had significant influence on the development of Brazilian political and constitutional thought.  
See DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 2-52.  French enlightenment thought was a guiding 
influence in the struggles for independence; yet, the excesses of the French Revolution 
horrified Brazilian elites, helping to produce a more conservative approach to the constitution 
and the building of the independent Brazilian state.  Id. at 27-46 (discussing this within the 
context of the career of nineteenth-century Brazilian statesman José Bonifácio de Andrada e 
Silva). 
 66. See GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 153-54, 201-02. 
 67. See id. at 24-30. 
 68. The Portuguese had begun the process of enslaving Africans even before their 
settlement of Brazil.  Although there were efforts to enslave the indigenous population in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the intercession of the Catholic Church had caused the 
Portuguese Crown to outlaw formally the practice in the seventeenth century, even though 
some enslavement of Indians continued informally beyond that point.  See id.  Still, Africans 
and their descendants were the principal group that was enslaved in Brazil and other parts of 
the Americas.  See id.; FREDERIC MAURO, LE PORTUGAL, LE BRESIL ET L’ATLANTIQUE AU 
XVIIE SIECLE (1570-1670), at 166-71 (1983). 
 69. See DA COSTA, supra note 25, 181-201. 
 70. See id. at 132-39. 
 71. Id. 
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nineteenth century was one where slaves were often predominately 
African.72  It was also one where African culture, often including 
Islamic-African culture—often seen as a distinct challenge to 
Portuguese Catholicism—provided a cultural basis for rebellious 
behavior on the part of slaves, either through outright revolts or the 
establishment of reconstituted African communities and cultures, the 
quilombos.73 
 Many native born Afro-Brazilians managed to attain their 
freedom and a measure of equality despite the harshness of Brazilian 
slavery.74  This occurred in part because the paucity of Portuguese 
settlers in Brazil left social and economic space for a free Afro-
Brazilian class capable of filling such roles as free artisan, truck 
farmer, and enlisted soldier, among others, that were filled by poor 
whites in the slave societies of North America.75  Mulattoes, like 
Rebouças, were also able to benefit from formal family ties with 
whites, such as legal recognition as legitimate children of white 
fathers.76  This formal recognition and consequent support were 
particularly important in Brazilian society where personal 
advancement was often strongly dependent on family ties and patron-
client relations.77 
 By giving us the Rebouças story as a man of the law in the early 
Brazilian Empire, Grinberg does much to shed light on the complex 
web of race, color, culture, class, and clientism in nineteenth-century 
Brazil.78  Rebouças began as an outsider to the elite world of 
practitioners of law and state affairs, the world of the bacharel in 
which he would attain preeminence.79  His status as a mulatto 
contributed to this and throughout his career would lead to charges that 
he sympathized with slave rebellions or that he sought to recreate a 
                                                 
 72. Id. 
 73. See GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 144 (discussing Rebouças’s role in putting down 
the slave rebellion in 1835); REIS, supra note 60, at 112-28 (discussing the role of Islam in 
the Bahian slave rebellion). 
 74. FRANCISCO VIDAL LUNA & HERBERT S. KLEIN, SLAVERY AND THE ECONOMY OF 
SÃO PAULO:  1750-1850, at 158 (2003). 
 75. Id. at 158-63. 
 76. This was true not only for legitimate children, but, as Linda Lewin informs us, 
Brazilian law had mechanisms to remedy or cure illegitimacy that was often presumed in 
cases involving people of African descent.  See 1 LEWIN, SURPRISE HEIRS, supra note 3, at 
63-64.  Illegitimacy was considered a “defect” of birth.  See id.  It was also possible in the 
colonial period to have a “defect” of color, i.e., African or indigenous ancestry by royal 
certificate.  See id. 
 77. See DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 188-91. 
 78. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 153-54, 201-02. 
 79. Id. at 186. 
  
 
 
2007] NORMATIVE NOMINALISM 13 
 
revolution similar to the one that had occurred in Santo Domingo.80  
But race was not the only reason Rebouças was an unlikely candidate 
for this elite world of law and governance.  The Brazilian bar and the 
bacharel class more generally were dominated by the sons of the elite, 
young men who had the time and money to study law, philosophy, and 
political economy at Portugal’s Coimbra University.81  Rebouças had 
neither and instead taught himself the law while working as a clerk in 
a notarial office.82  His efforts paid off.  In 1821, he was admitted to 
the practice of law with all the privileges normally reserved for 
graduates of the Portuguese university.83  By 1823, in part because of 
his support for the cause of independence, Rebouças met with 
Emperor Dom Pedro I, was appointed to a government position, and 
was made a Knight of the Order of the Cruzeiro.84  His public career 
was underway. 
 It is easy, too easy, to see an historical public figure’s public life 
and policy positions simply as an extension of his personal biography, 
social background, struggles for achievement and recognition, and as 
the sum total of his personal alliances and animosities.  We would like 
to believe, and indeed should believe, that more goes into the stands a 
public figure takes on the issues of his time.  This would be especially 
problematic to do with Rebouças, a complex man of both strong 
ambition and profound learning.  And yet Rebouças’s constitutional 
vision clearly owed much to both the harsh realities of social prejudice 
with which he was familiar as well as the potentialities for equality and 
mobility that the 1824 Constitution provided.85  Rebouças firmly 
resisted encroachments on the legal equality promised by the 1824 
Constitution.86  The struggle over who could be an officer in the 
National Guard was particularly revealing of Rebouças’s views of the 
links between law, race, and civilization.87  As a member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, in 1832 he opposed a measure that would have 
prevented libertos from receiving commissions in the National Guard, 
a militia controlled by the central government and used for internal 
security.88  Rebouças denounced the measure as “unjust, incendiary, 
                                                 
 80. Id. at 24-26, 102-03. 
 81. Id. at 238-42. 
 82. Id. at 69. 
 83. Id. at 71. 
 84. Id. at 77-78. 
 85. Id. at 34-35, 85, 101-02. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 101-02. 
 88. See DA COSTA, supra note 25, at 66, 68, 72-73, 186. 
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impolitic, and unconstitutional.”89  He noted that libertos aided in the 
struggle for independence.90  More revealingly, Rebouças cautioned 
his fellow deputies that they were following the dangerous example of 
the French in Haiti.91  By excluding libertos and other free people of 
color from the rights of citizenship in Haiti, they had set the stage for 
an alliance between the African slaves of that island and the free 
people of color who should have been the allies of the French.92 
 Grinberg discusses Rebouças’s position on the National Guard 
issue, noting that the Bahian deputy differed from a number of his 
liberal peers who were prepared to restrict the rights of libertos as a 
means of reinforcing the social order in which racial boundaries were 
important, even if not specifically sanctioned by law.93  And yet 
Rebouças’s dissent in this regard is not at all hard to understand.  
Rebouças’s fight for a broadly inclusive vision of citizenship was one 
that validated his own being—that of the self-made man of color who 
was able to use the law’s lack of formal restrictions, his own talents, 
and a bit of good fortune in securing powerful patrons to rise in a 
society where social prejudices were strongly arrayed against him.94  It 
was a formula that had not only worked well for Antonio Rebouças, 
but, as Grinberg informs us, for two of his brothers as well.95  
Rebouças feared the growth of the kind of restrictions that had 
occurred in France’s Caribbean colony were increasing in the United 
                                                 
 89. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 102 (author translation). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 102-03. 
 92. Historian Gwendolyn Midlo Hall discussed the growth of discrimination and 
legal restrictions against free mulattoes in Haiti throughout the course of the eighteenth 
century.  Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Saint Dominigue, in NEITHER SLAVE NOR FREE:  THE 
FREEDMEN OF AFRICAN DESCENT IN THE SLAVE SOCIETIES OF THE NEW WORLD 172, 174-79 
(David W. Cohen & Jack P. Greene eds., 1972).  Her research indicated that what had been a 
fairly mobile society for free people of color at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
became more and more restrictive toward the century’s end as French planters sought to 
maintain control over the expanding plantation economy.  See id.  Despite this, even at the 
end of the eighteenth century, Saint Dominigue (Santo Domingo) nonetheless had a 
significant free mulatto elite who were themselves planters and slaveholders.  See id.  Also, 
see historian Laurent Dubois’ discussion of increasing restrictions on the legal rights of gens 
de couleur and the loss of rights once guaranteed under the code noir in the French Caribbean 
in LAURENT DUBOIS, A COLONY OF CITIZENS:  REVOLUTION &  SLAVE EMANCIPATION IN THE 
FRENCH CARIBBEAN, 1787-1804, at 73-80 (2004). 
 93. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 101-02. 
 94. Id. at 77-78. 
 95. Grinberg notes that one brother, Manoel Maurício, studied medicine in Paris and 
later practiced and taught medicine in Bahia and another, José Pereira, studied classical music 
in Europe and became master of the Orchestral Theater in Salvador, Bahia.  Id. at 70.  A third 
brother Manoel Pereira was less successful.  Id.  He spent his working life as an office clerk.  
Id. 
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States at the time, and were closing off the possibilities of citizenship 
and equality that had so benefitted Rebouças and his family.96 
 But Rebouças, who could eloquently and forcefully defend the 
rights of all free citizens and, indeed, demonstrate a special concern for 
the rights of free and liberto Afro-Brazilians, had a decidedly less 
liberal record with regard to slavery.97  His views in some respects 
might be difficult for North Americans accustomed to equating racial 
liberalism with antislavery sentiment to sort out, but they were not all 
that singular in the Brazilian society of the first half of the nineteenth 
century.98  Rebouças at once believed slaves to be outside of “the 
Empire of law and rights” which governed free people.99  Slaves were 
property with only limited claims to the law’s protection.100  Yet, 
Rebouças strongly believed in the meritocratic ideal that allowed 
manumissions and the acquisition of citizenship and equal rights for 
libertos, the recently manumitted.101  He rejected racial restrictions on 
citizenship yet felt no problems denouncing African culture and 
African-led slave revolts and using the specter of such revolts to press 
the case for an alliance of the free regardless of color.102  As a deputy, 
Rebouças would support the abolition of the slave trade and yet would 
argue the case less on moral grounds and more on the grounds that the 
trade had to be outlawed to placate British sentiment.103  He would 
also argue for the importation of free Africans as agricultural 
laborers.104 
 Grinberg details Rebouças’s political career and how the political 
demands of Brazil’s increasingly conservative 1830s helped produce a 
conservative reaction in Rebouças that would later cause critics to see 
him as a representative of an old liberalism centered around the 1824 
Constitution and that failed attempt to adapt to Brazil’s evolving 
political and social realities.105  Particularly telling was his opposition 
to the Sabinada rebellion of 1837, a rebellion led by free mulattoes 
motivated in part because social prejudices were increasingly cutting 
off avenues of upward mobility, particularly in the military.106  
                                                 
 96. Id. at 108-09, 117-18. 
 97. Id. at 119. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (author translation). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 100-07. 
 102. Id. at 120. 
 103. Id. at 170. 
 104. Id. at 170-72. 
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Reboucas’s reticence with respect to this rebellion might be seen as 
part of his larger nationalist ideology, his strong support for national 
unity, and his opposition to a number of regional rebellions that were 
occurring in Brazil in the early decades of the nineteenth century.107 
 Rebouças’s political career effectively ended in 1848 with 
electoral defeat.108  He would devote the rest of his career to his law 
practice.109  Grinberg is especially skillful at showing how Rebouças’s 
complex combinations of sentiments and interests played out in one 
part of his practice, disputes over manumission claims.110  Students of 
slavery in the Americas have long known that in Brazil, as indeed in 
other parts of Latin America, slaves could make legally enforceable 
contracts for manumission.111  These contracts usually specified prices 
and terms under which slaves could purchase their freedom.112  In the 
cities of Latin America, including such Brazilian urban centers as 
Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, the ability of slaves to make 
legally binding manumission contracts, coupled with the constant 
demand for labor that existed in the urban economies, contributed 
greatly to the growth of free Afro-American populations.113  In Brazil, 
Rio de Janeiro’s Tribunal da Relação had appellate jurisdictions over 
                                                 
 107. Grinberg makes the interesting point that Rebouças saw his very identity as a 
mulatto as emblematic of Brazilian national unity.  Id. at 150.  His view that because his 
ancestry included both races he could empathize with all Brazilians enabling him to be “O 
fiador dos brasileiros” or “the guardian of the Brazilians.”  Id.  In a curious way, Rebouças 
anticipated the racial ideology of a number of twentieth-century Latin-American thinkers 
who emphasized that mestizaje, or race mixture, was critical to the formation of various 
national identities in Latin America.  GILBERTO FREYRE, BRAZIL:  AN INTERPRETATION 94-108 
(1945).  This was particularly true of Brazilian social scientist Gilberto Freyre, who stressed 
the importance of race mixture and the resulting mulatto population to the formation of 
Brazilian national identity.  Id.; see GILBERTO FREYRE, THE MASTERS AND THE SLAVES:  A 
STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRAZILIAN CIVILIZATION 66-84 (Samuel Putnam trans., Univ. 
of Cal. Press 2d rev. ed. 1986) (1971). 
 108. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 197-200. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 201-07. 
 111. See, e.g., FRANK TANNENBAUM, SLAVE AND CITIZEN:  THE NEGRO IN THE 
AMERICAS 52-62, 99-107 (1946); ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS 142-57 
(1989). 
 112. TANNENBAUM, supra note 111, at 54-57 (discussing manumission in Cuba); 
WATSON, supra note 111, at 54-55 (noting the development of manumission in Spanish 
America). 
 113. It should be noted that throughout the Americas cities were the venues where 
slaves were most likely to achieve freedom through self-purchase.  T. STEPHEN WHITMAN, 
THE PRICE OF FREEDOM:  SLAVERY AND MANUMISSION IN BALTIMORE AND EARLY NATIONAL 
MARYLAND 3-14 (1997) (discussing the growth of the free Negro population in Baltimore).  
Although the law in the southern states of the United States did not recognize the 
enforceability of manumission contracts, agreements between masters and slaves for self 
purchase and manumission existed nonetheless and were often honored, resulting in the 
growth of free Negro populations in a number of southern cities.  Id. 
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such cases known as “actions for freedom.”114  Here Grinberg was able 
to draw on her earlier work that examined the functioning of that court 
in freedom suits allowing her to place Rebouças’s advocacy before the 
Rio court in broader context.115 
 Grinberg’s discussion provides a truly valuable synthesis of legal, 
as well as social and cultural, analysis.  Rebouças would enter practice 
in Rio mostly representing property holders seeking indemnity from 
the government for losses incurred during the struggle for 
independence.116  His talent, ambition, and political connections had 
brought him into the ranks of the imperial city’s elite.117  He had a 
grand home, which included a magnificent library of nearly 3000 
volumes.118  Rebouças was the owner of seven slaves who acted as his 
house servants.119  And most importantly his admission to practice 
before the Brazilian Empire’s highest courts, despite not having a law 
degree, ensured that he could maintain a lucrative practice to support 
his seigneurial lifestyle.120 
 O fiador dos brasileiros takes us through the complex and 
changing ideological and legal terrain that shaped both advocacy and 
judicial decision making in the manumission cases.121  Certainly a 
foundational principle of Brazilian constitutionalism was the 
inviolability of property rights.122  This was consistently reiterated by a 
parliament and indeed a social elite in which slaveholders predomi-
nated.123 
 Yet, Brazilian law recognized manumission and indeed liberal 
sentiment in the empire was becoming increasingly antislavery as the 
nineteenth century unfolded.124  The contradiction between slavery and 
Brazil’s at least nominally liberal values was increasingly being 
recognized by more and more members of Brazil’s elites, including 
members of the bar.125  Grinberg outlines the important role played by 
the Brazilian bar, particularly from the 1860s onward, in moving the 
                                                 
 114. The actual term in Portuguese was ações de liberdade or actions of liberty.  See 
KEILA GRINBERG, LIBERATA:  A LEI DA AMBIGÜIDADE (1994). 
 115. See generally id. 
 116. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 197-98. 
 117. Id. 
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courts toward a promanumission posture.126  To do this, both bar and 
bench had to fight some of the newer developments in legal 
methodology.127  Civil law jurisdictions, particularly in the wake of the 
French Revolution, were moving toward greater codification as a 
device to reign in both creative advocacy and judicial latitude through 
strict adherence to codified rules.128  This ideal, of a jurisprudence 
constrained by a code and technical rules, ran up against the increased 
antislavery sentiment of members of the bar.129  It also ran up against 
the equities of individual manumission cases, despite the law’s 
presumptions in favor of the property rights of slave owners.130  These 
presumptions usually placed the burden of proof on the slave to 
demonstrate both the existence of a manumission agreement and that 
the slave had fulfilled the contractual requisites.131  Grinberg is 
especially insightful in showing how antislavery lawyers used multiple 
sources of law:  Roman law, Canon law, concepts of natural law taught 
at Coimbra, customary law, and other authorities were used to make 
the argument for freedom in individual cases where the positive law 
seemingly argued against manumission.132  The Tribunaisdais 
Relações (Relations Tribunals) would reject the view that it was bound 
by stare decisis, instead holding to a broad view of its interpretive 
preroga-tives.133 
 It is in her discussion of the legal profession’s balancing of the 
demands of its own antislavery idealism with the often harsh realities 
of proslavery positive law where Grinberg supplies a masterful 
interdisciplinary synthesis that combines a strong technical 
understanding of nineteenth-century Brazilian legal history with the 
history of ideas, particularly political philosophy, and the sociology of 
group consciousness.  In part, Grinberg’s discussion treads on some of 
the same ground explored by Robert Cover, in another context, when 
he looked at the response of antislavery northern jurists confronted 
with the dilemma of enforcing proslavery positive law, including 
federal fugitive-slave legislation.134  Grinberg sees the reaction of the 
                                                 
 126. GRINBERG, supra note 15, at 233-43. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See generally M.C. Mirow, The Power of Codification in Latin America:  Simón 
Bolívar and the Code Napoléon, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83 (2000). 
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 130. See id. at 217. 
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 132. Id. at 233-39. 
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bar and bench in Rio in the latter half of the nineteenth century as an 
example of the autonomy of the legal profession and to an extent it 
certainly is.135  But as Grinberg demonstrates, it is also a study in class 
attitudes and ideologies and how the legal profession and an important 
segment of the literate, university-educated bacharel class came to be 
connected to the wider world of liberal thought in the late nineteenth 
century and, by doing so, came to reject slavery and use the judicial 
process to undermine it. 
 Rebouças too would come to develop stronger antislavery views 
toward the end of the nineteenth century and his life.136  His son, 
Andreas, would become a significant figure in Brazil’s abolitionist 
movement as well as a collaborator with that nation’s great abolition 
leader Joaquim Nabuco.137  Through her study of Rebouças, 
previously a largely forgotten man in Brazilian history, Keila Grinberg 
has provided us with the kind of study of a life in the law that provides 
us with an important examination of the link between legal history and 
broader social and cultural influences that help shape history.  In a 
work that is in many ways both broadly interdisciplinary and also 
comparative, Grinberg helps to set the stage for an historiography of 
Brazilian law that takes us into previously underappreciated corners—
corners that tell us about the cultural origins of legal doctrine and the 
actual behavior of courts, jurists, and advocates.  She does this with 
reference to the institution—slavery—that perhaps more than any 
other helped to define Brazilian society and Brazilian culture. 
III. SCIENTIFIC RACISM AND EGALITARIAN CONSTITUTIONS 
 If slavery as an institution played a critical role in defining the 
society and culture of nineteenth-century Brazil, and indeed beyond, 
the generalization might be made with equal vigor concerning Cuba.138  
Cuba too would experience a sugar-fueled economic boom in the 
nineteenth century, fueled in part by the impact of the Haitian 
Revolution on sugar and coffee plantations in Santo Domingo.139  Like 
Brazil, Cuba would continue importation of African slaves well into 
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the nineteenth century.140  Cuba, like Brazil, did not abolish slavery 
until the 1880s.141  Spain abolished slavery in Cuba in 1886, two years 
before final abolition in Brazil in 1888.142  Alejandra Bronfman’s 
Measures of Equality:  Social Science Citizenship, and Race in Cuba, 
1902-1940, looks at the aftermath of Cuba’s nineteenth-century history 
of slavery and its derivative history of increased racial discrimination 
and differentiation.143 
 Like Grinberg, Bronfman is, in part, examining something of a 
constitutional dilemma.  Cuba’s Constitution of 1901 recognized the 
citizenship of all regardless of race.144  A constitution written in the 
Americas at the beginning of the twentieth century could hardly do 
less.  Besides, Afro-Cubans had played a major role in the struggle for 
independence.145  Antonio Maceo, an Afro-Cuban who became a 
general in the revolutionary forces and died in the struggle to liberate 
Cuba from Spain, had become a national icon.146  Still, if the law 
formally recognized the equality of all, the early twentieth century in 
Latin America, as indeed was also the case in the United States and 
other parts of the western world, was a time when strong ideological 
and scientific forces argued against doctrines of racial equality.147  In 
the United States, scientific racism and social Darwinism provided an 
intellectual underpinning for the willingness of the judiciary to allow 
Jim Crow laws and disenfranchisement in many American states.148  In 
Latin America, similar doctrines were causing intellectual and political 
leaders to ponder what to do with the large, frequently a majority, 
portions of their populations that were of indigenous or African 
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descent.149  These populations were seen as an embarrassment and a 
bar to national progress, i.e., the ability of a nation to join fully the 
western world dominated by Europeans and white North Americans.150  
Throughout the Americas the ideology of blanqueamiento, or 
whitening, would develop.151  Its tenets were fairly simple:  the nations 
of the Americas would try to become white nations through a 
combination of encouraging European immigration and encouraging 
the black and brown populations to disappear through mestizaje and 
by trying to define the children of mixed unions as white whenever 
possible.152 
 The issue could be especially acute in Cuba.  The island nation 
had a large Afro-Cuban population and one that retained significant 
African cultural practices, due in part to large scale African 
immigration in the nineteenth century.153  And Cuba at the beginning 
of the twentieth century was a society where U.S. influence was 
strong, owing in no small part to its proximity to the United States and 
the American occupation of the island between 1899 and 1902.154  
Consequently, as Bronfman details, early twentieth-century Cuba 
became a battleground between those who adhered to the 
constitutional ideal of racial equality and those who felt that the new 
scientific learning of the twentieth century dictated a subordinate, and 
hopefully only temporary, place for the Afro-Cuban.155 
 The war between these two sides was often fought out over the 
issue of expressions of African culture in Cuban life.156  For legal 
historians of race relations, postemancipation Latin America has often 
presented daunting challenges in trying to determine the role of law in 
maintaining racial hierarchy.  Unlike South Africa or the United States, 
the nations of Latin America had no body of racial legislation designed 
to mandate a superior status for whites and a subordinate status for 
others.157  Indeed the absence of such legislation and official apartheid 
or apartheid-like practices caused many observers from Latin America 
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and elsewhere to argue that Latin American societies were, in fact, 
racial democracies, free from the kinds of discrimination that prevailed 
in the United States and South Africa.158  Bronfman points to legal 
efforts to stigmatize and criminalize expressions of African culture as 
one way in which the presumably egalitarian law of Cuba could be put 
to the service of scientific racism and blanqueamiento.159  Bronfman 
tells a fascinating story of the enlistment of the new composite 
discipline of criminology along with anthropology to discover 
criminogenic features supposedly inherent in Afro-Cubans.160 
 Throughout the Americas the suppression of African cultural 
expression served many purposes.  It was seen as a defense of 
Catholicism and civilized values.161  It also served to deemphasize the 
large Afro-American element in Latin-American populations.162  
Latin-American nations trying to project, for the outside world and for 
themselves, an image of being essentially European could ill afford 
displays of still vibrant African cultures to be too public.163  In Brazil, 
legal suppression of expressions of African culture took the form of 
statutes forbidding the practice of the Afro-Brazilian religious rites, 
candomblé.164  Bronfman tells us of one effort to suppress African 
culture:  the campaign against brujo, or witchcraft, based on African 
cultural traditions.165  The campaign against brujo combined many of 
the elements that would define Cuban race relations in the first 
decades after independence.166  The concern with brujo was part of the 
obsession Cuban social scientists had with race and crime and the idea 
of an inherently criminogenic quality in Afro-Cubans.167  It would lead 
to hysteria, accusations of ritual murder, and lynchings.168  Here one 
might have wanted a somewhat more expanded discussion on 
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Bronfman’s part, perhaps more of a comparative discussion.  There is 
a considerable literature from the sociology of deviance on boundary 
maintenance, crime waves, and hysteria that could help to frame the 
discussion of the brujo hysteria in early twentieth-century Cuba.169  
Similarly, the phenomenon of lynching in the U.S. South has been 
examined by sociologists and historians and that literature also could 
help place in context Bronfman’s study of the brujo mobilization.170 
 Bronfman provides a good account of the Afro-Cuban reaction to 
the often hostile intellectual atmosphere that prevailed in elite 
circles.171  There was a range of Afro-Cuban reactions, as might be 
expected in a society where the possibility of advancement for an 
individual Afro-Cuban existed if he were willing to accept certain 
ideological preconditions—especially the cultural and racial inferiority 
of Africans and Afro-Cubans.172  Acceptance of these premises, 
coupled with the notion that the better elements of the Afro-American 
population could be civilized and join the ranks of the elite, were often 
the keys to upward mobility in Latin America, as we have seen with 
Grinberg’s discussion of Rebouças in Brazil.173  Bronfman details how 
some accepted this arrangement and also how increasingly Afro-
Cuban intellectuals began to struggle against scientific racism and 
notions of African cultural and racial inferiority.174 
 Bronfman’s discussion is particularly valuable as she leads us 
through the role of Afro-Cuban intellectuals and political organizers 
and their struggle over the Republic of Cuba Constitution of 1940 
(1940 Constitution) and the effort to achieve a constitution that would 
effectively guarantee equal rights under law.175  The 1940 Constitution 
provided explicit provisions against discrimination based on sex, race, 
color, or class.176 It also prohibited the formation of political parties or 
pressure groups based on race, class, or sex.177  The provision banning 
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racial discrimination was not self-enforcing, but empowered the 
Cuban Congress to pass enforcement legislation.178 
 And yet, as Bronfman concludes, the nominally liberal 1940 
Constitution failed in its promise to achieve racial equality, as indeed it 
failed in many other ways.179  The Cuban Congress failed to pass 
enforcement measures that would give teeth to the antidiscrimination 
provisions of the 1940 Constitution.180  Bronfman also ends with a 
telling observation that to understand how a constitution will be 
applied, the student must examine not only the written provisions but 
indeed the real structures of the state, “public opinion, political culture, 
corruption and the use of political violence” to understand how the law 
is actually going to be applied.181  It might be added that this was 
particularly true of the provision outlawing racial discrimination.182  
The article specifically required legislative enforcement, invariably 
throwing the rights of Afro-Cubans and other racial minorities back 
into the political process where skill and the formation of alliances 
would play a major part in determining whether the normative 
prescriptions of the 1940 Constitution would ever find effective 
enforcement.183 
IV. NORMATIVE NOMINALISM, GOOD INTENTION, INDIFFERENT 
RESULTS, AND BRAZILIAN LABOR LAW 
 It is the question of the gap between legal norms and effective 
enforcement that engages John D. French in Drowning in Laws:  
Labor Law and Brazilian Political Culture.184  French, a historian who 
has written extensively on Brazilian labor history, focuses his attention 
on Brazil’s Consolidação das leis do trabalho, or Consolidated Labor 
Code (CLT).185  The CLT was enacted in 1943 by the administration of 
populist dictator Getulio Vargas.186  It has remained the foundation of 
Brazilian labor law down to the present.187 
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 By its stated terms, the CLT was visionary, arguably the most 
advanced and protective labor legislation of the time.188  The Vargas 
government, proud of its work and seeing the law as a model for other 
nations, had the code translated into English for international 
consumption.189  Among other provisions, it protects the right to form 
labor organizations, prescribes conditions of employment and work, 
outlines procedures for the resolution of employment disputes, sets 
maximum hours and minimum salaries, sets limits on the discharge of 
employees, and provides regulations protecting the health and safety 
of workers, including special provisions for women and minors.190  As 
French notes: 
One is immediately struck by the extraordinary liberality with which 
the CLT accords rights and guarantees to urban working people and 
their organizations.  If the universe of work did in fact operate 
according to the CLT, Brazil would be the world’s best place to work.  
And if even half of the CLT was enforced, Brazil would be one of the 
more decent and reasonably humane places for those who work.191 
 But it is the failure of the CLT, its history of nonapplication and 
inadequate protection for Brazilian workers, that is French’s focus in 
Drowning in Laws.192  Key provisions of the CLT were routinely 
violated.193  Employers did so openly, often with the connivance of 
sympathetic government officials.194  Corruption was rampant among 
government inspectors charged with enforcing safety and other 
provisions protecting industrial workers.195  Labor courts also proved 
inadequate to the task of protecting Brazilian workers.196  Even when 
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they had strong cases or actually prevailed in court against employers, 
the prospect of delay in appellate litigation forced claimants to settle 
for a fraction of what they were owed.197 
 French traces the enforcement or failure to enforce the CLT 
through the different governments of postwar Brazil.198  The CLT 
remained an underenforced legal norm through a succession of 
governments, democratic and military, right and left.199  Particularly 
telling is French’s discussion of how even during the early 1960s 
under leftist labor-supportive Presidents Jãnio Quadros and João 
Goulart, Brazil’s labor courts proved inadequate to the task of CLT.200 
 How does one account for the failure of Brazilian law in so 
critical an area?  French takes us through several model explanations, 
pointing out their flaws and inadequacies.  North American scholars in 
the 1960s sought to explain labor relations within the context of Latin 
corporatism, i.e., a dependence on a strong state and state intervention 
in labor affairs to mediate working conditions.201  In a sense, this 
corporate model was an extension of the kind of paternalistic and 
hierarchical social relations that traditionally had prevailed in Latin 
societies with the state taking the place of the traditional patron as 
paternalistic protector.202  Under this model, labor protection remained 
weak because it was not the result of organizing and bargaining on the 
part of workers, but instead was an extension of traditional clientism 
with workers still dependent on others for protection.203  French 
dismisses this explanation at its simplest, not only for its 
ethnocentricity, but also for its assumption that past cultural patterns 
would have such a profound effect on present behavior patterns.204  I 
will return to this point a bit later. 
 French also rightly sees as too facile simplistic Marxist 
explanations that the CLT was fraudulent from the start, i.e., an attempt 
by the quasi-Fascist Vargas regime to impose the CLT on a reluctant 
industrial proletariat in order to preclude more radical, working class 
organization.205  French dismisses this view, as he had done in his 
earlier work.206  If the CLT was in part designed to forestall a certain 
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degree of working-class militancy, it nonetheless, as French notes, was 
also meant to provide a measure of labor protection, and it also left a 
political and social space for labor organizing that might otherwise 
have been absent.207 
 French sees a bit more promise in looking at the legal culture in 
Brazil as an explanation for the gap between reality and performance 
in the field of labor law.208  Students of Brazilian law and culture have 
long noted the conflict between the idealism and reality in Brazilian 
law.209  That tension was inherent from the beginning with the drafting 
of the 1824 Constitution containing strongly egalitarian and libertarian 
language masking its protection of slaveholding.210  That duality would 
continue in 1830 when Brazil signed a treaty outlawing the slave 
trade.211  It was a legal restriction Brazil’s elites had no intention of 
following:  they scornfully termed the treaty as something “for the 
English to see,” a device to placate the British committed to ending the 
African slave trade.212 
 But it would be a mistake to too quickly attribute the Brazilian 
gap between stated law and the law as actually applied as simply the 
result of self-conscious deception or of cynical manipulation of the 
legal system to benefit ruling elites.  These factors are at work, at times 
to be sure, but something more contributes to the failure of the 
Brazilian legal system to deliver on the promise of an effective legal 
regime.  That something more extends beyond the discussion of law 
and the rights of workers outlined in French’s study.  A 1971 article by 
North American legal scholar Keith Rosenn points us, at least part of 
the way, toward an understanding of Brazilian legal culture and how 
that culture regularly produces wide gaps between the stated and 
actual law.213  And although Rosenn’s article is steeped in the kind of 
culturalist explanation that French cautions us about, it does provide a 
useful historical and cultural context against which to understand 
Brazilian law and Brazil’s legal community.214  Rosenn’s explanation 
that the concept of jeito, roughly translated as knack or skill, is often 
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key to understanding how Brazilians understand the purpose of law 
and indeed how the law will actually work out.215  For Rosenn and 
others who have emphasized cultural explanations and Brazil’s legacy 
of paternalistic social relations, the multiplicity of legal sources that 
existed both during Brazil’s period as a colony of Portugal and during 
the nineteenth-century empire all contributed to a culture where the 
rule of law, at least as officially intended and stated, was weak—where 
one’s expectations of achieving satisfaction in the nation’s courts or 
from officials who staffed administrative agencies were frequently 
unfulfilled.216 
 And yet a cultural explanation such as the one proffered by 
Rosenn invites questions.  If social relations in parts of Brazil still bear 
the marks of the nation’s seigneurial past, there are parts of the nation 
for which, at least on the surface, this is decidedly not the case.  Brazil 
is the eighth-largest industrial economy in the world.217  Much of that 
economy is centered in São Paulo, a gigantic industrial megalopolis, 
and a large percentage of São Paulo’s population is descended from 
twentieth-century immigrants.218  Why, as French has shown in both 
Drowning in Laws and The Brazilian Workers’ ABC, haven’t modern 
labor relations and a more modern approach to labor law taken over in 
the more industrialized regions, regions less heir to the paternalistic 
past of the colony and empire? 
 As was the case with Grinberg in O fiador dos brasileiros, 
French realizes the importance of the legal profession as an 
autonomous subculture, setting to an extent its own rules and 
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developing its own system of values.219  This too would affect the 
behavior of law in Brazil in both direct and indirect ways.  This is true 
in the most obvious way—Brazilian lawyers, whether they are 
practicing attorneys, academics, jurists, or legislators are part of a 
wider world of people trained in law and in universities more 
generally.220  They historically have been part of the bacharel class.221  
That class in Brazil has been responsible for legal reforms—often 
doing so because they were influenced by liberal thought in the 
western world of which they were a part and often because they 
wanted to ensure the acceptability of Brazil in the eyes of their peers in 
Europe and the Americas.222  The 1824 Constitution, for example, 
clearly reflected the influence of the French Enlightenment.223  French 
antislavery thought and the example of American abolition fueled 
growing antislavery sentiment in this class and their ultimate support 
for the 1871 “Law of the Free Womb” and final abolition in 1888.224  
The roots of the CLT were influenced less by liberal ideology than by 
the corporatism of Benito Mussolini after whose regime Getulio 
Vargas modeled much of his Estado Novo.225  But even then the Vargas 
government translated the code into English, probably in part to 
impress the government of his wartime ally, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.226  In the postwar period Brazil would pass national civil 
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rights legislation, Lei Afonso Arinos, in part to make a statement that 
the nation was in fact the racial democracy that it claimed to be.227 
 But if the separate culture that was the legal community helped 
develop legal reforms and laws that made the outside world aware of 
Brazilian policies and Brazilian values, they also had internal norms 
and practices that sometimes thwarted the very reforms they were 
trying to implement.228  Brazilian lawyers and jurists have helped to 
develop a very inefficient legal system.229  Whether it can be 
explained, as Rosenn attempted, as a holdover from the Portuguese 
colonial system and the nineteenth-century empire of Dom Pedro I and 
Dom Pedro II, or whether some other explanation should be sought, 
the inefficiencies of the system are real.230  These inefficiencies play an 
important role in thwarting the stated aims of the written law, 
perpetuating a system where personalistic ties and jeito often play as 
great or greater a role in determining how, or indeed if, conflicts are 
resolved.231  If we take but two examples:  (1) Brazilian courts have 
historically not recognized stare decisis as a limitation on judicial 
decision making,232 and (2) the 1988 Constitution gives broad standing 
to potential litigants.233  The lack of stare decisis is common in civil 
law systems where the text of the code or constitutional provision, and 
not prior decisions, are supposed to be governing law.234  Broad 
standing is seen as part of a commitment to keep the courts open to all, 
a value that has been seen as particularly important since the return to 
democratic rule in the 1980s.235 
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 And yet both the absence of stare decisis and liberal standing, or 
broad access to the courts, has helped produce a judicial system often 
simply incapable of handling the sheer volume of cases that come 
before it.  Roberto Fragale Filho’s examination of Brazilian 
employment litigation illustrates this.  His article discusses both the 
open access Brazilian workers had to the labor courts in the 1990s and 
the large amount of employment litigation; nearly 2.5 million cases 
came before the labor courts toward the end of that decade (in the year 
1997).236  The problem is seen most acutely in the caseload and 
function of Brazil’s Supremo Tribunal Federal, the nation’s highest 
court.237  Because of the absence of both certiorari and stare decisis, 
the Brazilian high court receives and must decide over 100,000 cases 
per year, often producing huge backlogs.238 Decisions made by the 
court become, of course, the law of the case, but end up having value 
only as persuasive precedent, one of many sources of law.239  The legal 
issues raised and decided in a prior case can be revisited again by the 
lower courts.240 
 Efforts to make the system more efficient have frequently been 
resisted by the Brazilian bar.241  At least part of the task of studying the 
gap between the law as stated and the law as actually applied in Brazil, 
and indeed other legal cultures, involves examining the interplay 
between cultures, institutions, and the law.  If Brazilian lawyers are 
part of an educated class that reflect and try to implement international 
norms on workers’ rights, protection of minorities and women, and 
safeguarding the environment, among other areas, they are also part of 
an internal Brazilian legal culture committed to continuing traditional 
practices.  It would be surprising if this were not the case.  The legal 
profession in every society takes great pains to socialize new members 
into existing norms and practices.  It does so both through formal 
education in law schools as well as informal apprenticeships where 
newly minted law school graduates are turned into practicing 
attorneys.  People become familiar with and try to maintain those 
practices and structures with which they are not only familiar, but 
within which they indeed have been successful. 
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 All of which adds to the complexity of analyzing why and how 
the law gets implemented in different societies.  The juncture of often 
clashing societal interests that law is meant to mediate is often joined 
by a fragmented legal culture, lawyers representing different factions 
and interests combined with frequently conflicting internal demands 
from within the legal system.  In Brazil, and indeed other parts of Latin 
America, this combination has helped to produce a kind of normative 
nominalism where egalitarian norms have become enshrined in 
constitutions and statutes but have proven elusive in application.  Keila 
Grinberg, Alejandra Bronfman, and John D. French have all pointed us 
toward a better understanding of the complexities of the law’s 
formation and application in Latin America and by doing so have 
pointed us toward a richer and more textured legal history of the 
region. 
